

State Dept. review completed
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SECRET ATTACHMENT

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT

Executive Registry

November 9, 1962

62-8301

FOR: CIA - Mr. McCone

FROM: William H. Brubeck *WHL*
Executive Secretary *for*

For your information.

EXECUTIVE REGISTRY FILE

White House

SECRET ATTACHMENT

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November 9, 1962

FOR: CIA - Mr. McCone
FROM: William H. Brubeck
Executive Secretary

For your information.

SECRET ATTACHMENT

ACTION SLIP

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(To Remain With Correspondence)

TO: AF - Mr. MacQuaid

Control # 18541

Date November 9, 1962

Subject: Memorandum for Mr. Brubeck, from Mr. Carl Kaysen, dated November 7, re Contingency Plan for the Congo.

ACTION:

* PROMPT HANDLING IS ESSENTIAL. RETURN BASIC CORRESPONDENCE WITH REPLY. IF DELAYED CALL TELEPHONE EXTENSION BELOW.

For appropriate handling action.

AF should coordinate and follow up on this.

For direct reply.

* Prepare reply.

A response for signature by the _____
should be submitted to S/S by _____.

Appropriate clearances

should be obtained, including _____.

For your information.

Remarks:

(Copy of memorandum attached)

cc: S - Mr. Swank EUR - Mr. Holloway
U - Mr. Hartman G/PM - Mr. Dunlop
G - Mr. Hackler SCA - Mrs. LeStrange
IO - Mr. Handyside
S/S - Carol Moor
CIA - Mr. McCone (with Contingency Plan) Ext. 7552
DOD - Mr. McNamara (with Contingency Plan)

Slater
Warren Slater
S/S-R0

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Executive Registry

November 7, 1962

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MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. William H. Brubeck
Executive Secretary
Department of State

SUBJECT: Congo Review

1. The President reviewed the Congo problem with the Secretary of State, Under Secretary of State Ball, Under Secretary McGhee, Mr. G. Mennen Williams, Mr. Wayne Fredericks and Mr. Harlan Cleveland on November 7.

2. The President approved the plan of action presented in the State Department paper of November 6, "Proposed Contingency Plan for the Congo." In so doing, the President directed that discussions be begun as soon as feasible with the Belgians on their willingness to undertake sanctions against Tshombe. Mr. McGhee would go to Brussels for these discussions. He would make clear to the Belgians that we were asking for a contingent commitment conditional on Adoula's performing his part of the program and Tshombe's failing to act. We would at the same time make it clear to Adoula that our willingness to impose further pressures on Tshombe, including the economic sanctions, would be conditional on his making progress with the list of his tasks under the program. The exact time and mode of this negotiation was left open.

3. The President requested that the Secretary of State and Mr. McGhee brief all senators going to the Congo on our national policy with respect to the Congo and, to the extent possible, see that a well balanced group of senators did in fact make visits there.

4. The President directed an examination of the problems of moving to expel Struelens; he asked Mr. Kaysen to be responsible for this.

Eur
C | Pm
SCA

CIA - with copy of contingency plan and Kaysen
DOD - " " " " " Carl Kaysen

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MEMORANDUM FOR MR. McGEORGE BUNDY
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Proposed Contingency Plan
for the Congo

Attached is the proposed contingency plan for the Congo. The first draft of this plan was approved yesterday afternoon by the Secretary. Mr. McGhee subsequently revised the plan incorporating certain ideas expressed by the Secretary in the meeting that followed the Secretary's approval of the first draft. Mr. McGhee will not return from Maxwell Air Force Field until later this evening.

[s] E. S. Little

William H. Brubeck
Executive Secretary

Attachment

S/S-S:HA Holmes:mao:11/6/62

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PROPOSED CONTINGENCY PLAN FOR THE CONGO

Objective of our Policy

Stated in positive terms, the objective of our policy in the Congo is to achieve the settlement of the Katanga secession on terms representing agreement between Adoula and Tshombe, so that the outcome would be a viable Central Government under Adoula with Katanga retaining a reasonable measure of autonomy. In negative terms, we want to prevent a large-scale civil war as well as involvement of the UN in fighting, we want to deny to the radical Afro-Asians and the Bloc the opportunity of bringing the Congo into the sphere of their influence, and we want to prevent the UN from suffering a defeat in its first attempt at settling by military presence a major conflict.

Possible Developments

Although some progress is being made toward integration of Katanga through the UN Plan, we may at any time face a deadlock which we cannot resolve by pressure on Adoula and on Tshombe without risking renewed fighting between the UN and the Katanga troops. We do see a definite risk of such fighting if the UN should attempt to impose the Leopoldville Government on Katanga through forceful measures, even if limited to the economic field. A deadlock would not, however, last indefinitely but sooner or later would result either in withdrawal of the UN from the Congo, large-scale fighting between the ANC and the Katanga gendarmerie or the disappearance of the Adoula Government.

These developments might occur as follows:

- a) UN withdrawal might result from pressure by the GOC and the radical Afro-Asian countries for enforcement of the UN plan and our or other influential governments' refusal to permit the UN to take drastic action against Tshombe. In such a situation the Congolese Government would most likely request the UN to withdraw, or alternatively the Indians, Ethiopians, Indonesians, and other Afro-Asian nations contributing soldiers would withdraw their troops so that the UN could no longer stay in the Congo and the Secretary General would have to ask the Security Council to revoke the mandate under which he operates. This situation would give the USSR an opportunity to re-intervene in the Congo.

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The effects of a UN withdrawal for any of these reasons, whether by decision originating in Leopoldville or in New York, as a result of lack of troops, funds, or our or others' refusal to permit the UN to support the ANC, would create a very serious situation in the UN itself. The US would clash with the Africans supported, of course, by the Bloc. As a result of such a clash, the US position in the UN as well as in Africa would suffer and the prestige of the UN itself would be at stake.

b) Outbreak of large-scale hostilities between ANC and Katangese troops might result from a decision of the GOC to attempt ending the secession by military force, without prior UN approval. Should at such time the UN still be in the Congo, there would be considerable pressure on the Secretary General from the GOC and Afro-Asian countries to give Leopoldville assistance. Unless the fighting ended rapidly with a victory of the ANC, which is very unlikely, the pressure for UN support of the ANC would become very great and if we successfully opposed such support, the pressures on the UN to withdraw from the Congo would also increase substantially. In fact, certain nations contributing military forces to UNOC might wish to withdraw them and place them at the direct disposal of the Leopoldville Government. Tshombe on the other hand would get strong covert support from the European and white African sources.

c) Should the ANC engage in action without foreign support and be defeated by the Katangese, the Adoula Government would certainly fall. Since Adoula is generally recognized as being pro-American and following the policy of reconciliation, which the West has developed and supported, any new government would have an anti-Western bias.

d) Downfall of Adoula in a parliamentary session is likely if the Katanga issue is not resolved within the near future, Adoula now envisages transforming parliament into a constituent assembly which would take up the draft constitution. This may defer the day of reckoning. If this does not work Adoula, with the help of the chiefs of the army and police, might dissolve parliament and govern with emergency powers granted by President Kasavubu. Such a government, however, would have a very difficult time obtaining UN cooperation. A similar situation existed in 1960-61 before the Adoula Government was formed. The Afro-Asian

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nations would consider Adoula an American "stooge" and insist that the UN not give him support.

e) Conceivably, a downfall of Adoula in a parliamentary session might permit one of his opponents to form a government. By all indications such a government would be much less amenable to UN and US wishes. Radical influences would become dominant ^{and} eventually the Congo would join the group of the anti-Western neutralists. Algeria, Ghana and Yugoslavia are among those most likely to play an important role in such a situation. If troops were not offered by the African extremists to be used against Katanga, an extremist Congolese government would probably be willing to accept Bloc military assistance, if not troops, which would presumably be available for this purpose. The Congo would become the focus of African nationalism, which would not stop at the borders of Rhodesia and Angola.

Alternative US Policies

Strong US support of the UN position in the Congo, in particular its military and administrative capabilities, and of the Adoula Government through economic aid and support of the re-training and re-equipment of the ANC, would greatly reduce the danger of a serious deadlock developing on the UN Plan. In case such a deadlock did develop, such support should permit us to make an attempt at resolving it with good prospect of success. In particular, we should be able to influence Adoula's policy effectively and induce him to take a flexible attitude and increase his ability to withstand extremist pressures within the Parliament and his government.

A deliberate policy by the US Government to withdraw from the Congo by refusal to continue supplying airlift for the UN troops, by proposing the withdrawal of the UN itself from the Congo, or by creating financial difficulties for the continued operation of the UN in the Congo, would have the effects described above under (a). It would provide a ready opportunity for the Bloc to castigate the US as destroying the UN and might even permit them to muster a majority vote in the General Assembly in which the US and other Western powers would be made responsible for the UN inability to implement the resolutions of the Security Council in the Congo.

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Recommended Contingency Policy



Should the present effort of the UN to renew progress on the UN plan be unsuccessful we should engage in appropriate consultation with the UN, the Belgians and the British in order to obtain agreement on the following program:

1. Messages would be sent by the respective governments at an appropriate level to Adoula and Tshombe, urging them to resume work on the implementation of the UN plan.

2. The UN should define specific steps it expects both parties to take within a very short period of time, which should be stated.

3. With regard to Tshombe, these steps should include:

a) release of UN supplies at the borders;

b) regular monthly payments to Leopoldville of a fixed percentage, determined at the time, from revenues and foreign exchange earnings and acceptance of the principle of foreign exchange payments pending full agreement this issue;

c) rendering of the oath by the military;

d) acceptance of GOC customs and passport inspection at the Elisabethville airport which Adoula would be asked to open;

e) instruction

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e) instruction to Katangan representatives in the military and other commissions to cooperate constructively and the setting of firm deadlines for accomplishment of their tasks;

f) closing down the Foreign Ministry and of Katangese offices abroad;

g) granting freedom of movement for the UN in South Katanga, beginning first with the inspection of South Katanga military facilities.

4. We would follow up vigorously with Adoula the particular requests made of Bomboko by McGhee on October 31. Specifically, we would urge Adoula

a) to facilitate parliamentary consideration of the new constitution and give Katanga an opportunity to present proposed modifications;

b) to cooperate with the UN in putting tripartite observation teams into the field if this had not been done;

c) to issue a suitable amnesty and facilitate the execution of the oath of allegiance by the Katanga gendarmerie;

d) to instruct his representatives in the military commission and economic commissions to adopt realistic and flexible attitudes towards Katanga's real problems and accept deadlines for the accomplishment of their tasks;

e) to cooperate by every means possible in arrangements outside the plan, such as the opening of Elisabethville airport, establishment of GCC customs and immigration facilities in Katanga, etc.; and

f) in general do his part in creating a feeling of mutual confidence.

5. The UNOC military posture in Katanga would be strengthened

a) by

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a) by making available to UNOC two or more US Air Force cargo planes of adequate capacity to transport weapons, carriers, and other equipment into Elisabethville as well as aviation fuel and other supplies;

b) by increasing the Air Force capacity of the UNOC, preferably by obtaining an Italian or other European fighter squadron. If these are not available US fighter aircraft would be made available, with pilots of other nationality;

c) If desirable, efforts would be made to obtain additional UN troops.

The basic concept of this operation would be to strengthen the UN posture so to leave no doubt in the mind of Tshombe and his friends that the UN is able to back up the UN plan and could withstand an attack by Tshombe's military forces. In this way the danger of fighting would be greatly reduced.

6. In order to strengthen our capacity to influence Adoula, in particular to be able to make sure that he does not start large-scale fighting in North Katanga or be forced to resign, we would supplement our efforts to strengthen the UN posture by a program to strengthen Adoula's Government. This should include, in particular

a) stepping up of the implementation of the Greene plan by supplying transport and other equipment to the ANC;

b) the sponsoring of a training program for ANC officers;

c) training of an airborne gendarmerie unit; and //

d) further efforts to obtain financial support for the Congo to supplement US aid.

On the other hand, Tshombe would be deprived of any recognition of independence by

e) discontinuation of direct postal and telecommunication services with Katanga; and

f) refusal of visas and entry permits to Katangese without Congolese passports.

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7. In order to add force to these efforts and credibility to their being carried out, Tshombe and Adoula would both be advised that if Tshombe did not carry out the measures requested of him, and there was continuing support of the Plan by Adoula, that, after a definite period, say one month, the following actions would automatically be taken:

- a) Belgian technicians would be withdrawn from Katanga;
- b) Belgian and other companies operating in Katanga would be requested by their governments to pay their taxes and foreign exchange receipts directly to the GOC;
- c) The GOC would be requested to deny foreign exchange for imports to companies in the Congo associated with any companies that did not comply.

These steps can obviously not be undertaken without prior approval with the UN, the Belgian Government, and at least the acquiescence of the British Government. The approval of the Belgian Government would in all probability require some offers of assistance from the US Government as has been discussed with them to compensate for damages sustained by Belgian companies and Belgian nationals and Katangese.

Possible Results

If in fact it became necessary to carry out these measures, there is a real possibility that Tshombe would take retaliatory action against Belgian and other foreign nationals in Katanga and, in the event that it appeared that the stoppage of the plants would be threatening, might seek to take them over or perhaps even attempt their physical destruction. Under these circumstances the UN would make its best efforts to extend protection, which it would be in a better position to do for having been strengthened. In any event, the end product would likely be the closing down of the plants and a large scale exodus of Europeans, which would mean that the functioning of Katanga as an economic entity in anything like its present form would become impossible.

At this stage there would be a very real possibility of direct conflict between the UN and Katangan troops. However, it would,

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if it occurred, be as a result of Katangan initiative, which would make UN efforts to defend itself and extend its control over the remaining populated Katanga area, much easier from the standpoint of UN, US and world public opinion. The UN could then attempt to seize control of these areas, and, if successful, forcibly integrate that portion of Katanga into the Congo. Although Katangese resistance might continue in the "bush," it should be possible to insulate it from the populated areas and it would ultimately subside.

The eventualities which may result from the application of strong economic measures are ones that we would much prefer to avoid. However, it is believed that they represent a much lesser ultimate danger to the US, the UN and the free world, than to permit through failing to take the risks involved, the consequences which would otherwise ensue.

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